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 Introduction: 
The Constitution of Criminal  
Justice in Canada 
Benjamin L. Berger* and James Stribopoulos** 
In 1975, seven years before the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms1 entered onto the Canadian constitutional landscape, philoso-
pher Reginald Allen wrote the following in a Canadian publication on 
courts and the trial process: 
It is in the criminal process that the law and government most narrowly 
touch, beneficently and also dangerously, the lives of the governed. 
And it is here that instinct and passion beat hardest on rationality and 
restraint.2 
Allen’s words offer not only a lyric depiction of the animating tensions 
that make the criminal justice system such a crucial point for social and 
political inquiry, but also invite a legal historical question, a question that 
supplies the focus of this volume: what effect has the Charter had on the 
nature and quality — on the justness — of this crucial point of contact 
between government and the governed? Have the legal rights contained 
in the Charter served as legal ligatures, tying the Canadian criminal 
justice system to the mast of reason and restraint? 
To be certain, the hope was that a new era of criminal law and proce-
dure within a constitutional rights regime would create a more just 
system, one that would be more humane and fair for all, one that would 
more effectively bind state power and that would better protect both 
society and the accused — a system, in short, that would better strike that 
elusive balance between due process and crime control inimitably 
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1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 Reginald Allen, “The Trial of Socrates: A Study in the Morality of the Criminal Process” 
in Martin L. Friedland, ed., Courts and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Approach (Toronto and Buffalo: 
University of Toronto Press, 1975), 3 at 4. 
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described, years earlier, by Herbert Packer.3 All law reform imagines 
itself as part of the progressive realization of justice, but in this case there 
were structural bases for a more palpable and potent hope. More than a 
quotidian reform (if only meaningful criminal justice reform could be 
characterized as quotidian), this was a constitutional paradigm shift. The 
Charter would mark a shift away from a 200-year tradition of adversarial 
criminal justice in a world of parliamentary supremacy to a model in 
which the judicial branch would be formally vested with responsibility 
for checking executive and legislative action based on constitutional text. 
The hope of Charter enthusiasts was that the reason and restraint of the 
law would truly rule over the passions and instincts of criminal justice 
politics. 
This hope was quickly nourished. In the early years of the Charter, 
the Supreme Court of Canada invoked this new rights régime to make 
significant alterations to substantive and procedural aspects of the 
Canadian criminal justice system. Substantively, the Court moved to 
reform the law of fault, first declaring a minimum objective mens rea 
requirement for deprivations of liberty,4 and later invalidating Canada’s 
constructive murder provisions through reasoning about the constitu-
tional demands for subjective mens rea.5 On the procedural side, the 
Court’s early decisions suggested a radical transformation both of police 
powers, beginning with the incorporation of a constitutional warrant 
requirement into the law of search and seizure,6 and in the adjudicative 
process, with the Court’s landmark ruling on Crown disclosure.7 For at 
least the first 10 years with the Charter, it seemed that the constitutionali-
zation of criminal justice would prove axial, radically transforming not 
only the way that criminal justice was administered, but the very way 
that it would be thought about and debated, and leading progressively to 
a criminal law that would be covetous of individual rights and insulated 
from the changing temperature of political passions. 
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Thirty years on, what can be said of the legacy of the Charter in the 
Canadian criminal justice system? It would be both hyperbolic and facile 
to say that no substantial gains have been won through three decades 
with the Charter. The examples already cited are some such advances; 
the fact that capital punishment is seemingly banished from Canada is 
surely a profound systemic enlightenment.8 More broadly, the Charter 
has introduced a newly potent vocabulary for challenging the substantive 
limits of the criminal law.9 Yet it would be Pollyannaish to imagine that 
the system has moved inexorably in the direction of the just and re-
strained or that the fundamental political and social struggles of Cana-
dian criminal justice have changed by virtue of 30 years with the Charter. 
This is to say more than that doctrinal evolution has been incomplete or 
even regressive at times, though that is true and important.10 In many 
respects, the more significant observation is that the Charter has done 
little to disrupt the politics of criminal justice.11 The protection against 
cruel and unusual punishment has done virtually nothing to inhibit (and 
may have given political warrant to) the proliferation of minimum 
sentences;12 the Charter has had no discernable impact on the Aboriginal 
peoples’ violent experience of the Canadian criminal justice system;13 
and police powers and discretion have arguably expanded over the last 
30 years.14 So what can be said of the legacy of the Charter in the 
criminal justice system? The impact of the Charter is complex, ambiva-
lent as a normative matter, elusive as a political matter, and very much 
still unfolding. It is, in short, a profoundly unsettled legacy. 
And so despite a significant change in the available legal tools and in 
the constitutional architecture of criminal justice in Canada, what is most 
striking is that the story after 30 years with the Charter is as much one of 
continuity in logic and patterns, as it is one of change. The introduction 
of the Charter has not signalled a reinvention or revolution in the basic 
debates and struggles in Canadian criminal justice. Traditional criminal 
justice politics and history largely carry on, albeit through other means 
and in a new constitutional key. Consider, for example, that the funda-
mental lines and terms of debate on that central substantive issue — the 
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10 See the essays by Gerry Ferguson, Emma Cunliffe and Martha Shaffer in this volume. 
11 See the essay by Don Stuart in this volume. 
12 See the essays by Debra Parkes and Allan Manson in this volume. 
13 See the essays by Larry Chartrand and Jonathan Rudin in this volume. 
14 See the essays by Steve Coughlan and Vanessa MacDonnell in this volume. 
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limits of the criminal law — have not significantly altered since the Hart-
Devlin debate of the 1960s and 1970s15 and, arguably, since John Stuart 
Mill. Putatively ushering in a new era in limited government, the Charter 
has in fact occasioned almost no change in the shape of the debate about, 
or the actual boundaries of, Canadian criminal law. Lord Devlin and 
H.L.A. Hart would be perfectly comfortable with the terms of the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Charter deliberations on the limits of the 
criminal law.16 It may be that judges are now more intimately involved in 
these conversations; whether that has affected the democratic quality of 
Canadian criminal justice is perhaps the only incontrovertibly new 
debate occasioned by the Charter. The story of continuity is even more 
striking on the procedural side. Thirty years in, we can now observe, with 
irony, that the constitutional rights era in Canadian criminal procedure 
has actually ushered in a renaissance for common law police powers.17 
The exigency of policing in service of crime control, not the primacy of 
liberal conceptions of negative freedom, remains the standard-bearer for 
police powers in Canada. As this volume is published, Canadians are 
living in a politically driven atmosphere of harsh justice that the exis-
tence of the Charter seems to have done little to inhibit. 
That, despite its transformative pretensions, the legacy of the Charter 
in Canadian criminal justice is so ambiguous is perhaps unsurprising. 
Criminal justice deals with action and experience at the boundaries of 
comprehension, participates in an economy of power and violence, and is 
above all a human institution that seeks to manage the remains of social 
breakdown and to impose some kind of order and meaning on suffer-
ing.18 Criminal justice thus takes place at the limits of our understanding 
about how to respond; no change in legal tools alters this human dimen-
sion of crime and social policy. In the criminal justice system, instinct 
and passion will always beat on rationality and restraint, as Allen puts it, 
and though the terms and tools might shift, this ineradicably “political” 
                                                                                                             
15 Patrick Devlin, “Morals and the Criminal Law” in The Enforcement of Morals (London, 
Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1965) 1; H.L.A. Hart, “Immorality and Treason” in 
Richard A. Wasserstrom, ed., Morality and the Law (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1971) 
49. 
16 See, e.g., Benjamin L. Berger, “Moral Judgment, Criminal Law and the Constitutional 
Protection of Religion” in Jamie Cameron & James Stribopoulos, eds. (2008) 40 S.C.L.R. (2d) 513. 
17 James Stribopoulos, “In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the 
Charter” (2005) 31 Queen’s L.J. 1. 
18 See Benjamin L. Berger, “On the Book of Job, Justice, and the Precariousness of the 
Criminal Law” (2008) 4:1 Law, Culture, and the Humanities 98. 
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heart of criminal justice means that no Whiggish stories can be told, even 
of legacies of constitutional change. 
The contributions to this volume, prepared for Osgoode Hall Law 
School’s Constitutional Cases Conference in the spring of 2012, explore 
the law and politics of Canadian criminal justice after 30 years with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Through these essays one 
gains a fine appreciation not only of the complexity of the Charter’s 
impact on all dimensions of the criminal justice system, but of the 
perennial struggles that lawyers, judges, politicians and scholars face in 
seeking to make Canadian criminal justice more just. Don Stuart and 
Rosemary Cairns Way begin the volume by pulling back to consider 
broad trends and influences within criminal law over the last 30 years. 
Stuart squarely takes up the interaction of politics and criminal law, 
tracing the ways in which the Charter has and has not shaped the influ-
ence of law-and-order politics on our justice system. Cairns Way turns 
our attention to a Charter value that is meant to infuse our legal system 
— equality — and calls on us to critically assess the extent to which an 
ethic of substantive equality has infused the criminal justice system in 
the last 30 years. 
The twin themes of politics and social justice inflect the contribu-
tions that assess various impacts of the Charter on the state of substantive 
criminal law. The effect of the Charter on the political balance between 
the legislature and the judiciary is an important debate that has taken 
place in the last three decades with the Charter and Alana Klein focuses 
on the impact of the “great” legal right, section 7 of the Charter, on the 
role and jurisdiction of the legislature in substantive criminal law. In his 
contribution, Alan Young further interrogates the limits of the criminal 
law, offering an analysis that focuses on liberty as a pivotal concept in 
Charter criminal jurisprudence. Political will, constitutional limits, and 
the intersection of substantive criminal law and equality are all woven 
together in Gerry Ferguson’s careful analysis of the story of the law of 
intoxication in the Charter era. This section of the volume concludes with 
two pieces that address a legal and political flashpoint in contemporary 
criminal justice policy: mandatory minimum sentences. Debra Parkes 
analyzes the limited impact that the Charter has had on the proliferation 
of mandatory minimum sentences, providing an invaluable window onto 
the dynamic between constitutional law and political will. Allan Manson 
takes up similar issues, ultimately suggesting that a standard for assess-
ing the constitutionality of minimum sentences based on arbitrariness 
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would better capture the justice concerns with these hotly contested 
measures. 
The 30-year Charter journey of Canadian criminal procedure has 
been both tumultuous and complicated. Steve Coughlan begins the 
section of this volume on “Due Process and Its Limits” by offering a 
subtle and illuminating conceptual model for understanding the impact of 
the Charter on police powers. An unexpectedly important player in the 
unfolding story of police powers in the Charter era has been the ancillary 
powers doctrine, a controverted doctrine whose impact is not yet settled 
and is the focus of Vanessa MacDonnell’s contribution to this collection. 
From this broader foundation, Lisa Dufraimont and Steven Penney focus 
our attention on two related and intricate areas of Charter criminal 
procedure: the principle against self-incrimination and the law of police 
questioning. Dufraimont traces the many sites in which expressions of 
the principle against self-incrimination has appeared in constitutional 
criminal law, while Penney takes a careful look at the various modes of 
legal management of the problem of false confessions in the Charter era. 
The theme of criminal justice and equality comes into high relief in 
the final two sections of the volume. Perhaps no issue has more troubled 
Charter justice in criminal law than questions of gendered violence and 
sexual assault. Emma Cunliffe looks back over the jurisprudence on 
sexual assault and critically compares it to Canadian constitutional 
aspirations for substantive equality. Stitching together issues of gender 
violence and the limits of the criminal law, pornography has tested the 
force, scope and nature of the Charter’s impact, as Michael Plaxton 
explores in his piece on the Butler decision. Martha Shaffer closes this 
section on gender violence and sexual assault in an essay that emphasizes 
the political and legal continuities in the domain of sexual violence over 
the last 30 years, despite early hopes that the Charter would bring about 
progressive change in this area. 
Struggles to reckon with racial and ethnic equality, cultural differ-
ence and Aboriginal peoples shine another critical light on the play of 
politics and equality in the Charter-era criminal justice system. In her 
essay, Carissima Mathen looks at recent debates on the constitutionality 
of the crime of polygamy as a crucible for understanding the cultural 
force of both Canadian criminal justice and the Charter, and Jonathan 
Rudin and Larry Chartrand underscore the violence experienced by 
Aboriginal communities at the hands of the Canadian criminal justice 
system, an experience that the existence of the Charter has not palliated. 
Rudin takes stock of the past and invites us to think about the future of 
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criminal justice in a close analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
Aboriginal sentencing decisions, while Chartrand ends the collection, 
exploring what section 25 of the Charter might say about the sentencing 
of Aboriginal offenders, one of the most fraught political expressions of 
Canadian criminal justice. 
Taken together, the essays in this volume paint a picture that invites 
neither complacency nor despondency about the effect of the Charter on 
the justness of the Canadian criminal justice system. Rather, these 
leading scholars of Canadian criminal law have mapped for us the way in 
which the abiding challenges involved in the social and political effort to 
wrestle with wrongdoing, responsibility, blame and the dangers of state 
power have expressed themselves in a new constitutional architecture. In 
this, the volume sits at the vanishing point for the distinction between 
constitutional and criminal law, the point at which, in Reginald Allen’s 
words, “law and government most narrowly touch, beneficently and also 
dangerously, the lives of the governed”. This volume is a study in 
Canadian political and constitutional history, for as Allen himself 
observed: 
It is not by accident that the history of constitutional law, from chapter 
twenty-nine of Magna Carta to the Petition of Right, the Habeas Corpus 
Act, and the bills of rights ― English, American, Canadian ― may 
very largely be written as a history of criminal procedure. 
The past 30 years of criminal justice under the legal rights of the Charter 
thus take their place as a chapter in this unfolding story of Canadian 
constitutional law and politics. 
  
